Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U S Supreme Court

This book presents the first comprehensive model of policymaking by strategically-rational justices who pursue their own policy preferences in the Supreme Court's multi-stage decision-making process.

Author: Thomas H. Hammond

Publisher: Stanford University Press

ISBN: 0804751463

Category: Political Science

Page: 330

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This book presents the first comprehensive model of policymaking by strategically-rational justices who pursue their own policy preferences in the Supreme Court's multi-stage decision-making process.

Supreme Court Decision Making

The volume's distinguished contributors and broad range make it essential reading for those interested either in the Supreme Court or the nature of institutional politics.

Author: Cornell W. Clayton

Publisher: University of Chicago Press

ISBN: 0226109542

Category: Law

Page: 368

View: 437

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What influences decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court? For decades social scientists focused on the ideology of individual justices. Supreme Court Decision Making moves beyond this focus by exploring how justices are influenced by the distinctive features of courts as institutions and their place in the political system. Drawing on interpretive-historical institutionalism as well as rational choice theory, a group of leading scholars consider such factors as the influence of jurisprudence, the unique characteristics of supreme courts, the dynamics of coalition building, and the effects of social movements. The volume's distinguished contributors and broad range make it essential reading for those interested either in the Supreme Court or the nature of institutional politics. Original essays contributed by Lawrence Baum, Paul Brace, Elizabeth Bussiere, Cornell Clayton, Sue Davis, Charles Epp, Lee Epstein, Howard Gillman, Melinda Gann Hall, Ronald Kahn, Jack Knight, Forrest Maltzman, David O'Brien, Jeffrey Segal, Charles Sheldon, James Spriggs II, and Paul Wahlbeck.

The Choices Justices Make

Data culled from the Court′s public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices′ papers ...

Author: Lee Epstein

Publisher: SAGE

ISBN: 9781483304854

Category: Political Science

Page: 224

View: 665

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The Choices Justices Make is a groundbreaking work that offers a strategic account of Supreme Court decision making. Justices realize that their ability to achieve their policy and other goals depends on the preferences of other actors, the choices they expect others to make, and the institutional context in which they act. All these factors hold sway over justices as they make their decisions, from which cases to accept, to how to interact with their colleagues, and what policies to adopt in their opinions. Choices is a thought-provoking, yet nontechnical work that is an ideal supplement for judicial process and public law courses. In addition to offering a unique and sustained theoretical account, the authors tell a fascinating story of how the Court works. Data culled from the Court's public records and from the private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas, Marshall, and Powell provide empirical evidence to support the central argument, while numerous examples from the justices' papers animate the work.

The Chief Justice

Wright, “organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the US Supreme Court,” American Political Science Review 4 (1988); ... Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).

Author: David J Danelski

Publisher: University of Michigan Press

ISBN: 9780472119912

Category: Law

Page: 464

View: 301

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Scholars use the most advanced methods in judicial studies to examine the role of Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court

Oral Arguments and Coalition Formation on the U S Supreme Court

Strategic Retirements: A Political Model of Turnover on the United States Supreme Court.” Political Behavior 15 (1): 25–48. Hammond, Thomas H., Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan. 2005. Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on ...

Author: Ryan C Black

Publisher: University of Michigan Press

ISBN: 9780472118465

Category: Law

Page: 141

View: 202

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Oral arguments are a key aspect of the Supreme Court's decision-making process

Institutional Games and the U S Supreme Court

THOMAS H. HAMMOND is Professor of Political Science at Michigan State University. He is coauthor of Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court. His current research involves theoretical studiesofjudicial ...

Author: James R. Rogers

Publisher: University of Virginia Press

ISBN: 0813934192

Category: Political Science

Page: 320

View: 352

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Over the course of the past decade, the behavioral analysis of decisions by the Supreme Court has turned to game theory to gain new insights into this important institution in American politics. Game theory highlights the role of strategic interactions between the Court and other institutions in the decisions the Court makes as well as in the relations among the justices as they make their decisions. Rather than assume that the justices’ votes reveal their sincere preferences, students of law and politics have come to examine how the strategic concerns of the justices lead to "sophisticated" behavior as they seek to maximize achievement of their goals when faced with constraints on their ability to do so. In Institutional Games and the U.S. Supreme Court, James Rogers, Roy Flemming, and Jon Bond gather various essays that use game theory to explain the Supreme Court's interactions with Congress, the states, and the lower courts. Offering new ways of understanding the complexity and consequences of these interactions, the volume joins a growing body of work that considers these influential interactions among various branches of the U.S. government. Contributors: Kenneth A. Shepsle, Andrew De Martin, James R. Rogers, Christopher Zorn, Georg Vanberg, Cliff Carrubba, Thomas Hammond, Christopher Bonneau, Reginald Sheehan, Charles Cameron, Lewis A. Kornhauser, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Matthew Stephenson, Stefanie A. Lindquist, Susan D. Haire, Lawrence Baum

The Oxford Handbook of U S Judicial Behavior

Policy without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari Game. ... “Separation-of-powers games in the positive theory of congress and courts.” American Political Science ... Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court.

Author: Lee Epstein

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 9780199579891

Category: Political Science

Page: 625

View: 680

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"[This book offers] an introduction and analysis of research regarding decision making by judges serving on federal and state courts in the U.S...[This handbook] describes and explains how the courts' political and social context, formal institutional structures, and informal norms affect judicial decision making. The Handbook also explores the impact of judges' personal attributes and preferences, as well as prevailing legal doctrine, influence, and shape case outcomes in state and federal courts. The volume also proposes avenues for future research in the various topics addressed throughout the book."--

Judicial Process in America 9th Edition

Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau, and Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Palo Alto, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2005). 92. Robert Moog, “The Indian Supreme Court in the 1990s ...

Author: Robert A Carp

Publisher: SAGE

ISBN: 9781452226323

Category: Law

Page: 475

View: 728

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Known for shedding light on the link between the courts, public policy, and the political environment, the new ninth edition of Judicial Process in America provides a comprehensive overview of the American judiciary. Considering the courts from every level, the authors thoroughly cover judges, lawyers, litigants, and the variables at play in judicial decision making. This remarkably current revision will only solidify the bookÆs position as the standard-bearer in the field.

Bankruptcy and the U S Supreme Court

“Developing a Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals. ... “Unions Lose as High Court Backs Companies in Bankruptcy Filings.” New York Times p. A1. ... Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court.

Author: Ronald J. Mann

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

ISBN: 9781107160187

Category: Law

Page: 250

View: 432

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This book provides a comprehensive study of the Supreme Court's bankruptcy cases, illustrating and explaining the structural reasons for the Court's narrow bankruptcy perspective.

Commitment and Cooperation on High Courts

situate a justice in a unidimensional policy space relative to other justices. 8. ... supra note 4; Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau & Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the US Supreme Court (Stanford, ...

Author: Benjamin Alarie

Publisher: Oxford University Press

ISBN: 9780190466404

Category: Law

Page: 200

View: 411

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Judicial decision-making may ideally be impartial, but in reality it is influenced by many different factors, including institutional context, ideological commitment, fellow justices on a panel, and personal preference. Empirical literature in this area increasingly analyzes this complex collection of factors in isolation, when a larger sample size of comparative institutional contexts can help assess the impact of the procedures, norms, and rules on key institutional decisions, such as how appeals are decided. Four basic institutional questions from a comparative perspective help address these studies regardless of institutional context or government framework. Who decides, or how is a justice appointed? How does an appeal reach the court; what processes occur? Who is before the court, or how do the characteristics of the litigants and third parties affect judicial decision-making? How does the court decide the appeal, or what institutional norms and strategic behaviors do the judges perform to obtain their preferred outcome? This book explains how the answers to these institutional questions largely determine the influence of political preferences of individual judges and the degree of cooperation among judges at a given point in time. The authors apply these four fundamental institutional questions to empirical work on the Supreme Courts of the US, UK, Canada, India, and the High Court of Australia. The ultimate purpose of this book is to promote a deeper understanding of how institutional differences affect judicial decision-making, using empirical studies of supreme courts in countries with similar basic structures but with sufficient differences to enable meaningful comparison.