Regulatory Interventionism in the Utility Industry

In a look toward the future of interventionist regulatory behavior, Barkovich concludes that in the future regulators will face more stringent limitations in pursuing certain forms of interventionism.

Author: Barbara R. Barkovich

Publisher: Praeger

ISBN: STANFORD:36105038532979

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 181

View: 507

DOWNLOAD →

During the 1970s and early 1980s utility regulators moved from largely unintrusive regulatory practices towards more aggressive and intrusive strategies. This study explores the reasons for the change and examines the trade-offs involved between seeking fairness to customers and efficiency of operations as primary goals of regulatory policies. An extended case study of the California Public Utilities Commission's conservation policies and utility programs from 1975 to 1984 is used to test theoretical explanations of interventionism. In a look toward the future of interventionist regulatory behavior, Barkovich concludes that in the future regulators will face more stringent limitations in pursuing certain forms of interventionism. Business Information ALERT This pioneering study analyzes the changing nature of utility regulation in the United States, with particular emphasis on the 1970s and early 1980s when regulators moved from largely unintrusive regulatory practices toward more aggressive and intrusive strategies. Barkovich explores the reasons for this change in regulatory behavior and examines the trade-offs involved between seeking fairness to customers and efficiency of operations as primary goals of regulatory policies. Theoretical explanations of regulatory interventionism are then tested in an extended case study of the California Public Utilities Commission's (CPUC) conservation policies and utility programs from 1975 to 1984--widely cited as among the most active and creative in the nation. Barkovich identifies three factors influencing regulatory decisionmaking--interest groups, the regulatory commission organization, and ideology--and proposes an extension of existing regulatory theory to explain interventionist behavior. Based upon an in-depth examination of the CPUC's policymaking, she demonstrates that regulatory interventionism has a number of prerequisites, among them factors which promote regulatory autonomy and reduce external constraints upon regulators. Finally, Barkovich looks toward the future of interventionist regulatory behavior in an increasingly market-oriented, service delivery system, concluding that, in the future, regulators will face more stringent limitations in pursuing certain forms of interventionism. Energy industry professionals, regulatory decisionmakers, and students of the utility industry and of government regulation of business will find important new insights into the social, political, and economic dynamics of utility regulation.

Regulating Public Utilities in Europe

Recoge: 1.

Author: Burkard Eberlein

Publisher:

ISBN: STANFORD:36105070859280

Category: Public utilities

Page: 49

View: 621

DOWNLOAD →

Recoge: 1. Concepts and theories of regulation -- 2. The aftermath of liberalization: The challenge of re-regulation -- 3. The new regulation game: The pluralisation hypothesis -- 4. British utility regulation: Whose utility? -- 5. Lessons from British experience and the German and French case -- 6. Explaining the regulatory process and outcomes -- 7. In Lieu of conclusions: Proposals for comparative research on utility regulation.

Regulating Power The Economics of Electrictiy in the Information Age

BIBLIOGRAPHY Acton, J.P. “An Evaluation of Economists' Influence on Electric Utility Rate Reforms.” American Economic Review, 1982, ... Barkovich, B.R. Regulatory Interventionism in the Utility Industry. New York: Quorum Books, 1989.

Author: Carl Pechman

Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media

ISBN: 9781461532583

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 229

View: 788

DOWNLOAD →

Modem industrial society functions with the expectation that electricity will be available when required. By law, electric utilities have the obligation to provide electricity to customers in a "safe and adequate" manner. In exchange for this obligation, utilities are granted a monopoly right to provide electricity to customers within well-defmed service territories. However, utilities are not unfettered in their monopoly power; public utility commissions regulate the relationship between a utility and its customers and limit profits to a "fair rate of return on invested capital. " From its inception through the late 1970s, the electric utility industry's opera tional paradigm was to continue marketing electricity to customers and to build power plants to meet customer needs. This growth was facilitated by a U. S. energy policy predicated upon the assumption that sustained electric growth was causally linked to social welfare (Lovins, 1977). The electric utility industry is now in transition from a vertically integrated monopoly to a more competitive market. Of the three primary components (generation, transmission, and distribution) of the traditional vertically integrated monopoly, generation is leading this transformation. The desired outcome is a more efficient market for the provision of electric service, ultimately resulting in lower costs to customers. This book focuses on impediments to this transformation. In partiCUlar, it argues that information control is a form of market power that inhibits the evolution of the market. The analysis is presented within the context of the transformation of the U. S.

The Regulation of Water and Waste Services

These are generally provided under natural or legal monopoly, so there is no incentive for utilities to search for greater efficiency and effectiveness and as such there is an increasing prevalence of such risks for users.

Author: Jaime M. Baptista

Publisher: IWA Publishing

ISBN: 9781780406527

Category: Science

Page: 237

View: 110

DOWNLOAD →

The public water supply, urban wastewater and urban waste management services are essential to the well-being of citizens, public health and economic activities. These are generally provided under natural or legal monopoly, so there is no incentive for utilities to search for greater efficiency and effectiveness and as such there is an increasing prevalence of such risks for users. For these reasons, society can significantly benefit from the existence of regulatory intervention capable of introducing greater balance in the relationship between utilities and their users. The Regulation of Water and Waste Services: An Integrated Approach (Rita-Ersar) presents a practical integrated regulatory approach to these water and waste services. This approach is called the ARIT-ERSAR model and it is capable of contributing to the promotion of access by citizens to these services that is tending towards the universal. These services are provided with suitable quality by utilities at socially acceptable prices and with an acceptable level of risk. This approach consists of a regulation model with two major areas of intervention: structural regulation of the sector and regulation of the performance of the utilities. The components of structural regulation are contributions to organisation, legislation, information and sectoral capacity building. The performance regulation of utilities consists of legal and contractual regulation, economic regulation, quality of service regulation, drinking water quality regulation and user interface regulation. Author: Jaime Melo Baptista, Chairperson of the Water and Waste Services Regulatory Authority, ERSAR, Portugal

Regulating Platforms as Utilities

Current discussions about how to regulate platforms revolve around the extent to which existing frameworks can and should be applied to modern-day platform firms and business models.

Author: Tobias Kretschmer

Publisher:

ISBN: OCLC:1249556447

Category: Competition, Imperfect

Page: 34

View: 431

DOWNLOAD →

Current discussions about how to regulate platforms revolve around the extent to which existing frameworks can and should be applied to modern-day platform firms and business models. We outline and explain the economic and strategic features of platforms, and compare and contrast them to utility industries often considered structurally similar. We will then outline the manner in which these industries have been regulated and the rules for regulatory intervention and assess how these approaches and others currently being discussed are likely to affect competition and innovation on modern-day platforms.

Successes and Failures in Regulating and Deregulating Utilities

This book is the latest annual review of utility regulation and deregulation, published in association with the Institute of Economic Affairs and the London Business School

Author: Colin Robinson

Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing

ISBN: 1845420780

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 216

View: 868

DOWNLOAD →

This book is the latest annual review of utility regulation and deregulation, published in association with the Institute of Economic Affairs and the London Business School

The Power Brokers

The industry has sought to manage, co-opt, and profit from government regulation. In The Power Brokers, Jeremiah Lambert maps this complex interaction from the late nineteenth century to the present day.

Author: Jeremiah D. Lambert

Publisher: MIT Press

ISBN: 9780262330992

Category: Business & Economics

Page: 400

View: 701

DOWNLOAD →

How the interplay between government regulation and the private sector has shaped the electric industry, from its nineteenth-century origins to twenty-first-century market restructuring. For more than a century, the interplay between private, investor-owned electric utilities and government regulators has shaped the electric power industry in the United States. Provision of an essential service to largely dependent consumers invited government oversight and ever more sophisticated market intervention. The industry has sought to manage, co-opt, and profit from government regulation. In The Power Brokers, Jeremiah Lambert maps this complex interaction from the late nineteenth century to the present day. Lambert's narrative focuses on seven important industry players: Samuel Insull, the principal industry architect and prime mover; David Lilienthal, chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), who waged a desperate battle for market share; Don Hodel, who presided over the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) in its failed attempt to launch a multi-plant nuclear power program; Paul Joskow, the MIT economics professor who foresaw a restructured and competitive electric power industry; Enron's Ken Lay, master of political influence and market-rigging; Amory Lovins, a pioneer proponent of sustainable power; and Jim Rogers, head of Duke Energy, a giant coal-fired utility threatened by decarbonization. Lambert tells how Insull built an empire in a regulatory vacuum, and how the government entered the electricity marketplace by making cheap hydropower available through the TVA. He describes the failed overreach of the BPA, the rise of competitive electricity markets, Enron's market manipulation, Lovins's radical vision of a decentralized industry powered by renewables, and Rogers's remarkable effort to influence cap-and-trade legislation. Lambert shows how the power industry has sought to use regulatory change to preserve or secure market dominance and how rogue players have gamed imperfectly restructured electricity markets. Integrating regulation and competition in this industry has proven a difficult experiment.

Regulation of the electric utility industry

By completing this table , the regulator determines , systematically , the_types of companies and corporate structures ... that warrant regulatory attention , and to the types of regulatory intervention ( including no intervention ) .

Author: United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Energy and Natural Resources

Publisher:

ISBN: PSU:000065513248

Category: Competition

Page: 107

View: 443

DOWNLOAD →